For God or Country? Comparing the Sources of Anti-American and Anti-Muslim Attitudes

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ABSTRACT
Negative attitudes about Americans pervade the Muslim world. And many Americans hold negative views of Muslims. Although prior literatures provide many explanations for the sources of antagonism in each population, scholars have yet to provide a direct comparison between the two. Thus, instead of *explaining* the attitudes themselves, this research *compares* them. When the same questions are asked of Americans and Muslims, are the same variables significant predictors of antagonism? We use 2008 and 2011 survey data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project and ordered probit models to answer this question at two distinct points in time. The results illustrate the importance of domestic politics for both populations, providing insight into the potential utility of foreign policies designed to improve attitudes. Additionally, we find that the story of religion's influence on anti-American attitudes is a complex one, which changes depending on how religiosity is operationalized. This research represents a first step in bringing the literatures on anti-Muslim and anti-American attitudes together, while also revealing important similarities and differences in the sources of antagonism.

Scholars and policy-makers in the USA and in the Muslim world have expressed concern regarding the negative attitudes that their populations hold toward one another. High levels of animosity not only damage bilateral relationships, but can also hurt efforts at international cooperation and may even lead to violence. A necessary precursor to reducing antagonism is to better understand where it comes from. Are its sources in the USA different from those in the Muslim world? There are many explanations for the negative views Americans and Muslims hold of one another, but scholars have not yet directly compared the two. In many ways, the literature on anti-Americanism around the world and the literature on anti-Muslim attitudes in the USA have grown as separate research agendas, leaving scholars and policy-makers ill-prepared to answer questions about any potential shared sources of antagonism. Without a direct comparison, it is difficult to understand whether antagonism derives from similar sources in both groups – do Americans who are dissatisfied with the direction of their own country dislike Muslims more than Muslims who are dissatisfied with the directions of their own countries dislike

Americans? Do religious Muslims dislike Americans more than religious Americans dislike Muslims?

Our research aims to fill this gap by using data collected by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. The surveys ask very similar – in many cases identical – questions of respondents at approximately the same point in time. This individual-level survey data, collected from the USA and five Muslim-majority countries (Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey) in 2008 and 2011, provides the opportunity to examine snapshots in USA–Muslim relations to answer this key question: how do the sources of anti-American attitudes in the Muslim world and anti-Muslim attitudes in the US compare? Instead of *explaining* the attitudes themselves, as many previous scholars have done, our interest is in *comparing* them. When the same questions are asked of Americans and Muslims, are the same variables significant predictors of antagonism?

The greatest contribution of this study, and its greatest limitation, are the data. Although comparability is the goal, perfect comparability is impossible given the data available. Most importantly, in the USA, respondents were asked whether they had a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims. This question wording presents two key problems: first, it means that American respondents, when giving their responses, may be thinking of Muslims within the USA rather than Muslims from the Muslim-majority countries included in this study. Second, because respondents in Muslim-majority countries were asked their opinion of Americans, we are forced to compare results from one country regarding a religious group with results from five countries regarding a group based on nationality. We recognize the limitations of these data, but proceed nevertheless because individual-level attitudes are what we are most interested in and, as far as we know, there are very few surveys in which American respondents are asked their views of Jordanians, Indonesians, or Lebanese. The Pew data, which contain the same question wording collected from nationally representative samples at the same point in time, is the best data we have for directly comparing antagonistic attitudes.

Explaining negative attitudes

As social identity theory has established over decades of research (e.g. Ruffle and Sosis 2006; for a review, see Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002), dividing the world into the categories of 'self' and 'other' is one of the most basic and persistent attributes of human interaction (Olweean 2002; Boydstun and Glazier 2013). Social and cultural groupings are fundamental to human societies (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Triandis et al. 1988), a part of basic human cognition (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Decety and Sommerville 2003; Ochsner et al. 2004), and very relevant for understanding antagonistic attitudes between groups. The further a group is seen to be from one's own in-group, the more likely negative attitudes are (Levinson 1949; Allport 1979). For instance, Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner (2009) find that Muslims are outsiders in a particular way in the USA, because they are often seen as members of both racial and religious out-groups. Similarly, Rowatt, Franklin, and Cotton (2005) find that Christians in the USA are more favorably disposed toward Christians than toward Muslims. Simply put, prejudice and antagonism toward ethnic, religious, and cultural out-groups is common and persistent (Tajfel 1981; Snellman and Ekehammar 2005; Ford 2011) and, generally speaking, we should expect

similar trends to be present in the two groups we examine here (Hewstone 1990; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

Relations between the USA and the Muslim world have certainly included their share of prejudice and antagonism. For instance, Chiozza's (2010) wide-ranging study of anti-Americanism finds much higher levels of anti-Americanism among countries in the Middle East than in other regions of the world. And negative attitudes in the USA are quite persistent. The days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks saw an increase in attacks against Muslims by a small percentage of the population despite an increase in pro-Muslim attitudes in national surveys, which, however, soon leveled off to a baseline level of negative opinion (Panagopoulos 2006). Similarly, the Arab Spring has failed to move public attitudes toward the USA; most Arab countries retain high levels of anti-Americanism (Telhami 2011). This indicates a source of antagonism that runs deeper than the direction that domestic or international winds blow.

Here, we evaluate three main explanations for negative attitudes that are commonly referred to in the literature: foreign policy, domestic politics, and religion. The data limitations and the research question at hand lead us to test necessarily underspecified models. The insight these models provide comes through direct comparison of common variables. We address the literature on and our operationalization of these three explanations – foreign policy, domestic politics, and religion – in the following three sections.

Foreign policy

Although we are comparing individual-level attitudes toward people, not toward governments, there remain many reasons to believe that variables related to foreign policy may influence the degree to which individuals hold negative attitudes. Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequent 'war on terror', Americans did not view Muslims favorably (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) and many in Muslim-majority countries did not view Americans favorably (Panagopoulos 2006; Chiozza 2010), but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are nevertheless an especially salient foreign policy issue for both publics we investigate here.

For instance, in the USA, terrorism has been shown to cue more negative attitudes toward Muslims (Gerges 2003; Huddy et al. 2005; Park, Felix, and Lee 2007). Especially since 11 September 2001, media coverage has perpetuated negative stereotypes of Muslims (Persson and Musher-Eizenman 2005). An experimental study by Martin, Grande, and Crabb (2004) demonstrates that those who watched more media coverage of the war in Iraq were more likely to display prejudices against Muslims. Sides and Gross (2013) also find that some Americans stereotype Muslims and those who do are more likely to support the 'war on terror'. Thus, it follows that support for foreign policies that are closely tied to fighting terrorism and the response to 9/11 are likely to be associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in the US sample.

Anti-American attitudes are common in Muslim-majority countries and around the world, as many scholars have found (e.g. Clawson and Rubin 2004; Hollander 2004; Ross and Ross 2004; Judt and Lacorne 2005; Faath 2006; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Chiozza 2009). One of the most widely cited reasons for anti-American attitudes in the Muslim world is American foreign policy.[1] The USA has a long history of involvement in conflicts in the Middle East and these involvements have often been seen as

running counter to the interests of Muslim countries (Ross and Ross 2004; Mitchell 2004). The USA's continued support for Israel (Parker 1988; Mitchell 2004; Abdallah 2003), the humanitarian disaster that resulted from sanctions on Iraq (Abdallah 2003), the overthrow of political leaders (Mitchell 2004), and other foreign policy choices seem to many Muslims to represent an abrasive, brash, and unilateral approach to foreign policy that breeds resentment of American power (Makdisi 2002; Kohut and Stokes 2006), even in countries that are not themselves the direct target of such policies.

Thus, whereas support for foreign policies designed to fight terrorism is associated with anti-Muslim attitudes in the USA, those in the Muslim world who support American foreign policy in the war on terror are more likely to view the USA and its citizens more favorably (Chiozza 2010). American military action in the Muslim world is seen as a major source of anti-American attitudes (Makdisi 2002; Naim 2002; Tessler 2003; Abdallah 2003; Vedrine 2004; Cole 2006; Faath 2006), with opposition to American foreign policy a significant predictor of anti-American attitudes, including support for violence against American military targets (Berger 2014).

In both samples, respondents were asked whether they supported keeping troops in Afghanistan. Although this question is only a single measure – and specific to only the portion of American foreign policy that relates to troop levels in Afghanistan – having the same measure of attitudes in both populations allows us to compare the extent to which this policy gives rise to antagonistic attitudes on either side. This is far from the only relevant foreign policy issue, of course. For instance, American support for Israel is a particularly salient foreign policy issue, especially in the Muslim world (Parker 1988; Abdallah 2003; Mitchell 2004; Telhami 2004; Chiozza 2010; Jamal 2012), but we are unable to measure its impact here due to limitations in the data.

Another foreign policy dimension is economic policies. To oversimplify it somewhat, some negative attitudes in the Muslim world may result from what Barber (2010) calls a backlash against 'McWorld' or what Chiozza (2010) considers an anti-market world-view. Many Muslims are simply scared by what they view as the hyper-capitalism of the USA (Cole 2006) and one does not have to look to the fringes of Muslim-majority countries to find those who believe in a global imperialist conspiracy to enslave Muslims economically (Kizilbash 1988). Many Muslims may see the USA, since it is a global economic power, as the source of the economic status quo (Regnier 2001; Rubin 2002; Tessler and Robbins 2007). One way to operationalize this is through Pew's questions regarding support for liberal trade policies. We would expect that those respondents from Muslim-majority countries who respond positively would also view Americans – strongly associated with capitalism and classically liberal economic policies (Overbeek 2002; Chiozza 2010) – favorably. And, since liberal trade policies are associated with a more inclusive and international perspective that is common in post-materialist societies (Inglehart 1981, 1997) and a tendency toward cooperation rather than conflict (Wittkopf 1990; Holsti 2009), we would similarly expect a positive relationship between American respondents' support for trade liberalization and favorable attitudes toward Muslims.

Domestic politics

When it comes to domestic politics, research supports the idea that attitudes toward local political leaders and conditions are likely to influence the opinions of others. In a general

sense, when things are not going well at home, some citizens may direct their anger outward (Ferree and Miller 1985; Simon and Klandermans 2001). We would expect this process to function in both the Muslim-majority countries in the sample and in the USA.

In a seminal study, Tai, Peterson, and Gurr (1973) find that stress (specifically, socio-economic stress) within a country is a much stronger predictor of anti-Americanism than American involvement or presence there. In a more recent study, Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that respondents in Arab countries are more likely to support suicide bombing against the USA when they are dissatisfied with the domestic political and economic status quo. Domestic politics in the USA are likely to have a similar impact on American attitudes toward Muslims (Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2009). Thus, we use a measure of satisfaction with the direction in which the respondent's country is heading to operationalize domestic political influences, and expect that, for both samples, negative views of domestic politics will translate to negative views of the perceived other.[2]

In reality, domestic political factors in the causes for antagonist attitudes are likely to be much more complex than this simple measure can capture. For instance, Blaydes and Linzer (2012) argue that American foreign policy is mediated through local political elites, who are often motivated by political competition to employ 'instrumental' anti-Americanism (Rubinstein and Smith 1988, 41). Rubin (2002) argues that anti-Americanism is not driven so much by American policies as by the way that self-interested local elites exploit those policies – combined with tendencies toward anti-Americanism in the population – to further their own goals. In the USA, party politics are likely to have an impact (Gaines et al. 2007; Berinsky 2009; Dueck 2010). For instance, experimental work has demonstrated a connection between anti-Muslim attitudes and opposition to President Barack Obama (Tesler 2011). Despite the potential explanatory power provided by additional domestic politics considerations, in order to make as close a comparison as possible across models, we do not include party identification or any other questions that were asked in only one sample.

Religion

The final category of explanations for mutually negative attitudes relies on religious and cultural differences. Scholars such as Huntington (1993) and Lewis (2004, 1990) have pointed to cultural and religious differences as the key points of conflict in a nearly inevitable 'clash' between Islam and the West. In a post 9/11 USA, America's greatest enemies are sometimes defined in religious rather than ideological terms (Smidt 2005; Den Dulk 2007) and some argue that religious Muslims see American values and culture as a religious and cultural threat (Fuller 2004; Ajami 2003; Esposito 2002). Public opinion data in the USA reflect the views of a sizeable minority (Cimino 2005) who see Islam itself as violent and threatening (Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2009), a view even more common among conservative Christians (Martin, Grande, and Crabb 2004; Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008). Rowatt, Franklin, and Cotton (2005), for example, find that Christians who are 'born again', fundamentalist, and practice their religion more regularly are all more likely to hold negative opinions of Muslims. And although some argue that the idea of cultural hatred is a myth (Esposito and Mogahed 2007), the notion that Muslims who are more religious will hold stronger anti-American attitudes than those who are less so is nearly taken as a given in the literature (Blaydes and Linzer 2012, 226).

Some research, however, has questioned the relationship between religion and antagonism, finding that statistically controlling for personality characteristics such as right-wing authoritarianism (Awad and Hall-Clark 2009) mediates the influence of religion. For instance, Taydas, Kentmen, and Olson (2012) find that Evangelical Christians in the USA are not significantly different from other religious groups when it comes to their attitudes toward Islam. And Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that religion is not a significant variable when it comes to approval of terrorism by Muslims against targets in the West. Tessler (2003) similarly finds that favorable attitudes regarding democracy, the USA, and even peace with Israel are not predicted by religious measures.

One of the greatest challenges in accounting for the influence of religion is in measuring it. In the literature on religion and American politics, religion is usually measured in three ways: belonging (religious affiliation), believing (theology), and behaving (religious activity) (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Steensland et al. 2000; Wilcox, Wald, and Jelen 2008). The Pew data uses a relatively large number of religion questions, yet many measures are either not relevant across religious traditions or not asked of both samples. The common questions are frequency of prayer (scaled differently for the different samples) and a measure of how important religion is in the respondent's life. Muslim respondents were also asked how often they fasted during Ramadan and, in 2011 only, American respondents were asked how often they attended church. These religious behavior measures give us some insight into the religiosity of respondents, but still leave much to be desired when it comes to understanding the potential relation between religion and antagonism.

In particular, the literature on the influence of religious belief has illustrated its importance (Bader and Froese 2005; Finke and Adamczyk 2008; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012; Glazier 2013, 2015), even demonstrating that accounting for theological content in statistical models can eliminate the impact of belonging and behavior variables (Guth et al. 2006; Guth 2009). Scholars have even noted an increase in post-9/11 rhetoric that includes Islam as a main protagonist in biblical 'end times' scenarios (Cimino 2005). Other scholars have found that personal views of God – as vengeful and judgmental or as loving and open – influence trust of Muslims (Hinze, Carson Mencken, and Tolbert 2011).

Given this literature, it may be the case that personal religiosity is simply not the best operationalized variable by which to measure religion (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Hoffman and Jamal 2014), particularly when it comes to understanding relationships between Islam and the West (Tessler 2003). For instance, Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2012) include in their models religious practice, adherence to political Islam, and the belief that jihad is an external militarized struggle that can be waged by individuals; their results indicate that only the last factor predicts support for political violence. There are many reasons to believe that including such measures in our models of antagonism would improve their predictive power and our understanding of these mutually negative attitudes. Such measures are rarely available, however, and they are not included in this dataset. While certainly imperfect, the culturally specific religious behavior measures in the Pew data allow us to directly assess whether the religious populations of either sample are more likely to hold negative attitudes than the less religious respondents.

Methods

The data we use represent two snapshots in time captured by the 2008 and 2011 waves of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which collects individual-level data from countries around the world. The sample we use includes data from the USA and five countries with Muslim-majority populations. The proportions of Muslim majorities in these countries are described parenthetically using 'The Future of the Global Muslim Population' survey (Grim and Karim 2011): Indonesia (88.1%), Jordan (98.8%), Lebanon (59.7%), Pakistan (96.4%), and Turkey (98.6%).[3] These five countries are used in the following analysis because they are the only Muslim-majority countries surveyed in both the 2008 and 2011 waves of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. They also represent a diverse sample in terms of geography, political systems, and relations with the USA, which makes both the pooled and the individual country models informative.

We utilize ordered probit models, which are the most appropriate model type, given the multinomial, ordinal nature of our dependent variable. Other scholars analyzing anti-American attitudes across multiple countries have used multi-level models, to account for country-level differences (Blaydes and Linzer 2012). While this approach is inappropriate for our goal of direct comparison – the USA is a single country and so not suited for multi-level modeling – we do use a mixed-effects, multi-level Poisson model as a robustness check of our model of anti-American attitudes.

Because ordered probit coefficients do not represent the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we report a measure of magnitude by calculating 'first differences' (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). This statistic allows us to directly compare of the level of influence of the significant independent variables on the dependent variable. In our results, the first differences we report measure the probability of the dependent variable being very unfavorable as the independent variable of interest moves from its minimum to its maximum while all remaining independent variables are held at their appropriate measures of central tendency.

Dependent variables

The Pew data we employ for this study include two similar favorability questions, which serve as the dependent variables in the analysis to follow. We measure antagonism using a single favorability question as the dependent variable for each model, rather than creating a scale of anti-American or anti-Muslim attitudes as other scholars have done (e.g. Blaydes and Linzer 2012), for a number of reasons. First, because of the nature of the questions asked by Pew and our desire to compare across samples, asking respondents in Muslim-majority countries about their attitudes toward 'Americans' as opposed to 'the United States' is the best corollary to asking respondents in the USA about their attitudes toward 'Muslims'. This allows us to directly compare individual-level attitudes about people rather than about states, which marks a key contribution of our study. As discussed above, there are drawbacks to this approach, which compares the attitudes of respondents from a single country regarding a religious group with the attitudes of respondents from five countries regarding a national group. For similar reasons, we choose not to use questions about American ideas and values as either independent or dependent variables in the

models – there are no similar questions asked of American respondents regarding Islamic ideas and values.

The dependent variables we selected allow for direct comparison of the variables that predict anti-Muslim attitudes held by respondents in the USA to the variables that predict anti-American attitudes held by Muslim respondents in the Muslim world at two distinct moments in time and across time between two survey waves, providing context and comparability.

Independent variables

The independent variables we include in our models are meant to provide exactly similar operationalized tests of all three contributory factors (foreign policy, domestic politics, and religion) on both populations. These variables, and the expected direction of effect on the dependent variables, are summarized in Table 1. Foreign policy is measured by support for keeping troops in Afghanistan and support for trade liberalization; domestic politics is measured by whether the respondent thinks things are going in the right direction in his/her country; religion is measured through a continuous summary measure of religious behavior.

For Muslim respondents, the religiosity measure is created by summing the scores for three religion questions: frequency of prayer, frequency of fasting during Ramadan, and importance of religion in their lives, resulting in a 12-point religiosity scale. For American respondents, the religiosity measure is created by summing, in 2008, frequency of prayer and importance of religion in their lives, resulting in a 7-point scale of religiosity. In 2011, Pew added a question about frequency of church attendance, resulting in a 12-point scale of religiosity for the 2011 anti-Muslim attitude models.

This approach is comparable to others used in the literature, although we do not include denominational affiliation – common in the religion and American politics literature (e.g. Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Steensland et al. 2000) – because of data limitations. Some scholars have focused attention on the antagonistic attitudes of the very religious. For instance, Blaydes and Linzer (2012) collapse the 12-point religiosity summary measure we use into a binary variable: those scoring 12 on the 12-point scale are coded 1 and all others are coded 0. As a robustness check, we follow the same procedure for our Muslim sample and our American sample and also run our models with binary

Table 1. Operationalization of variables with expected direction of effect of key independent variables on the dependent variable in parentheses.

Anti-American model	Anti-Muslim model
Dependent variable	*Dependent variable*
Anti-Americanism	Anti-Muslim Attitudes
Independent variables	*Independent variables*
Keep troops in Afghanistan (negative)	Keep troops in Afghanistan (positive)
Growing trade is good (negative)	Growing trade is good (negative)
Satisfaction with things in country (negative)	Satisfaction with things in country (negative)
Religiosity (positive)	Religiosity (positive)
Gender	Gender
Age	Age
Education	Education
Income	Income
Country dummies	

religiosity variables representing the most religious respondents.[4] Thus, our models include both approaches common in the literature and allow us to compare them in order to evaluate what effect, if any, changing the operationalization of religiosity has on antagonistic attitudes.

Additionally, we run our anti-American models first with country dummy variables and then as individual models. We know from the literature that both anti-American (Chiozza 2010) and anti-Muslim (Savelkoul et al. 2012) attitudes vary across countries, so it makes sense to account for those variations here. We also include in all models the control variables of gender, age, education, and income. By using the same measures across populations, we are one step closer to getting the literatures on anti-Americanism and anti-Muslim attitudes to speak directly to one another. With this data we are able to directly compare apples with apples for the first time: do the same variables have a significant and similar impact in the models of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world as they do in the models of anti-Muslim attitudes in the USA?

Results

The results of our anti-American and anti-Muslim attitude models are presented side by side in Table 2. The 2008 results are presented in the first two results columns, followed by the 2011 results in the next two.

Looking first at foreign policy, support for keeping American troops in Afghanistan is not significant for either model in 2008, although it does become a significant and negative predictor of anti-American attitudes in 2011, perhaps as a result of the announced troop drawdown plans (Obama 2011). The first difference reported in Table 2 indicates that, in 2011, changing the value of support for keeping troops in Afghanistan from its minimum to its maximum while holding all other variables constant creates a 12% decrease in the probability that the respondent would be strongly anti-American. The belief that growing trade is good also has a significant and negative effect on antagonistic attitudes toward Americans in 2008 and a significant and negative effect on antagonistic attitudes toward Muslims in 2011. In both cases, the effects are relatively small: 2.5% and 5.1%, respectively. These results indicate that foreign policy – especially military policy – may matter to respondents in the Muslim world, but not to those in the USA, when it comes to determining negative attitudes.

In terms of domestic politics, those respondents who are satisfied with the direction in which their country is heading held more favorable views in three of the four models. Only in the 2008 anti-Muslim model is country direction satisfaction not significant. The marginal effects of this variable are also consistent across models and time, decreasing antagonism by between 5% and 8% when satisfaction moves from its lowest to its highest value. It appears that domestic politics matter to a significant and similar extent in predicting both anti-American and anti-Muslim attitudes.

When it comes to religiosity, we find significant and positive effects in the anti-American models only. In 2008, moving from the least religious to the most religious score on the 12-point religiosity scale leads to a 12% increase in the probability of very negative attitudes being held about Americans. In 2011, the predicted probability increases to 14.6%. The religiosity variables are not significant in the anti-Muslim models. These results indicate that the more religious a Muslim respondent is, the more likely he or she is to hold

Table 2. Anti-American and anti-Muslim ordered probit models.

Independent variables	Anti-American 2008			Anti-Muslim 2008			Anti-American 2011			Anti-Muslim 2011		
	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.010	0.052		−0.006	0.0999		−0.362***	0.061	0.120	0.081	0.085	
Growing trade is good	−0.138***	0.025	0.154	−0.060	0.051		0.029	0.027		−0.178***	0.051	0.078
Satisfaction with country	−0.152***	0.046	0.054	0.192	0.111		−0.209***	0.045	0.073	−0.284***	0.057	0.088
Religiosity	0.030***	0.008	0.121	−0.004	0.022		0.037***	0.008	0.146	0.008	0.012	
Gender	0.034	0.041		0.274***	0.094	0.044	−0.030	0.039		0.186*	0.086	0.025
Age	0.003	0.002		0.014***	0.003	0.207	−0.003	0.002		0.008***	0.002	0.082
Education	−0.012	0.022		−0.116***	0.039	0.018	−0.046*	0.021	0.051	−0.021	0.036	
Income	−0.048**	0.018	0.053	−0.029	0.047		−0.044**	0.018	0.048	0.061	0.042	
Indonesia	−0.281***	0.059					−0.436***	0.056				
Lebanon	−0.405***	0.067					−0.309***	0.068				
Pakistan	0.536***	0.066					0.772***	0.063				
Turkey	1.042***	0.074					0.906***	0.068				
Cut 1	−1.509	0.129		−0.236	0.228		−10.352	0.125		−0.754	0.206	
Cut 2	−0.259	0.126		0.014	0.230		−0.191	0.123		0.554	0.206	
Cut 3	0.482	0.126		0.749	0.236		0.556	0.124		10.406	0.211	
N	3106			576			3400			679		
Number of countries	5			1			5			1		
LR chi^2(12)	5930.20			480.88			7880.27			680.05		
Prob > chi^2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1. Jordan is the reference category for country dummies in the Anti-American model.

*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.

anti-American attitudes, while religiosity is not a significant predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes in the USA.

We look a little more deeply at the question of religion's influence by running the models again, but with the binary religiosity variable instead of the continuous religiosity variable. Recall that, under the binary religiosity conceptualization, the most religious respondents are coded 1 and all others are coded 0. Using this operationalization, we find that the religiosity variables fail to reach significance in all four models – a somewhat surprising result, given that the binary religiosity variable accounts for the *most* religious respondents in the sample. Clearly, the relationship is not a linear one. The most religious Muslims are no more likely to hold anti-American attitudes than are the rest of the sampled Muslim population.

The control variables tell a story of very different societies. Gender matters for anti-Muslim attitudes in 2008 and 2011 – men are about 9% more likely to hold strongly negative attitudes than women, all else being equal – but not for anti-American attitudes. Similarly, age matters for anti-Muslim attitudes in 2008 and 2011, with older Americans being more likely to hold anti-Muslim attitudes, but age is not significant for anti-American attitudes.

When it comes to anti-American attitudes, we find that income is a significant predictor in both 2008 and 2011, with predicted probabilities indicating that the wealthiest Muslim respondents are about 5% less likely to hold strongly anti-American views than the poorest, all else being equal. Income is not a significant predictor in either model of anti-Muslim attitudes. Education presents a more mixed story. In 2008, respondents with more education are slightly less likely (0.018 first difference) to hold anti-Muslim attitudes, although the level of education has is no effect on anti-American attitudes. In 2011, education is a significant (although at $p < .1$ level) and negative predictor of anti-American attitudes, with a 0.021 first difference, but is not significant for the anti-Muslim model. Education does not seem to be having a consistent effect on either anti-American or anti-Muslim attitudes.

For both the 2008 and the 2011 anti-American models, all of the country dummy variables are significant (Jordan is the reference country), indicating that the specifics of anti-American attitudes vary by country.[5] We thus run the same model specification on each individual country and report simplified results in Table 3. If a variable is significant for a

Table 3. Anti-American country-level ordered probit model summaries.

Variable/country	Indonesia		Jordan		Lebanon		Pakistan		Turkey	
	2008	2011	2008	2011	2008	2011	2008	2011	2008	2011
Keep troops in Afghanistan				_**		_***	+**		_***	
Growing trade is good	_***	_***		+***	_***			+*	_**	_**
Satisfaction with country	_***	_**		_***		+**	_***	_**		
Religiosity	+**							+**		+**
Gender										
Age						_**				
Education		+***				_**		_**		_*
Income				_***			_***		_**	
N	647	675	784	834	552	496	595	800	528	595
Prob > chi²	.000	.000	.005	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001	.001	.008

*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$

specific country year, that cell contains either a positive or negative sign to indicate direc-tionality, as well as asterisks to indicate the level of significance. If the variable was not sig-nificant for that country year, the cell is left blank. The full model results are included in the Appendix in Tables A2–A5.

Table 3 reveals a great deal of variance across and even within countries. Support for keeping American troops in Afghanistan is positively associated with anti-Americanism in Pakistan, but negatively in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Belief that growing trade is good is positively associated with anti-Americanism in Jordan and Pakistan, but the relationship is negative in Turkey, Lebanon, and Indonesia. Similarly, satisfaction with the direction in which one's country is moving is negatively related to anti-Americanism in Pakistan, Jordan, and Indonesia, has no significant relationship in Turkey, and is posi-tively related to anti-Americanism in Lebanon. We see similar variance in the control vari-ables as well, although gender is consistently insignificant across the board. Religiosity is perhaps the most consistent variable, with respondents who are more religious in Indone-sia, Pakistan, and Turkey all holding more negative views of Americans than those who are less so. Here again, though, the data indicate a deeper story. In no country model is the binary religiosity variable significant. The full country models calculated with the binary religiosity variable are available in the Appendix in Tables A2–A5.

Discussion and conclusion

While the work previously conducted on anti-American and anti-Muslim attitudes has advanced many novel and important explanations, no studies have yet brought these dis-parate research strands together to directly and systematically compare explanations from both sides of the divide. We go directly to the source of these attitudes – the individuals who hold them – and compare apples with apples across groups. Examining antagonistic attitudes with the same measures does not tell us everything we need to know – we lack many measures that would help achieve such a goal, including specific measures of reli-gious belief (Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012), personality measures such as authoritar-ianism (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), and measures of perceived out-group threat (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). Despite these limitations, our analysis here is the first direct comparative look across these two groups. While we cannot fully explain why Americans in the USA and Muslims in Muslim-majority countries view each other so unfavorably, our comparisons do reveal similarities and differences in the sources of antagonistic attitudes in the USA and in the Muslim world.

For instance, domestic politics matter for both samples – antagonism is predicted by how satisfied the respondent is with how things are going in his or her own country. This indicates that antagonistic attitudes are not deeply rooted in irreconcilable differ-ences, but may instead stem from out-group bias – and, importantly, that the same process of out-group bias is likely at work in both populations. We expect that the causal mechanism at work is that citizens who are upset with the direction their country is taking look outwards to place blame (e.g. Tai, Peterson, and Gurr 1973), but it may also be the case that domestic elites are purposely fomenting anti-Americanism for political gain (e.g. Blaydes and Linzer 2012) or that a pro-American regime is seen as illegitimate by the population (e.g. Parker 1988; Clawson and Rubin 2004). In-depth case studies can reveal more about the nature of the relationship between anti-Americanism

and domestic dissatisfaction in specific countries; the data here simply tell us that the two are positively correlated.

It is also important to note that not much changed between the 2008 and 2011 models, for either population. The political situation in the USA changed significantly from 2008 to 2011 with transition from the Bush to the Obama administration, but it appears that anti-Muslim attitudes are stable enough to withstand changes in domestic political leadership. The end of 2010 also marked the beginning of the Arab Spring, but the models of anti-Americanism remain remarkably similar from 2008 to 2011.

We also find that American foreign policy plays a larger role for Muslim respondents in Muslim-majority countries when they evaluate Americans than it does for American respondents when they evaluate Muslims. These findings are important because they point to potential pathways to foster better relations between the USA and the Muslim world.

As far as religion is concerned, our findings reveal a complex story beneath the surface. Respondents in the USA who are more religious are not more likely to hold negative attitudes about Muslims than respondents who are less so, but respondents in the Muslim world who are more religious are more likely to hold negative attitudes about Americans than respondents who are less so. Importantly, however, this finding only holds when religion is measured as a continuous variable, rather than as a binary variable that captures the most religiously devout. Thus, although religiosity is a significant and positive predictor of anti-Americanism, this result should be interpreted with caution. The relationship between religious devotion and negative attitudes is not linear; if that were the case, the most religious respondents, represented by the binary operationalization of the religiosity index, would be much more likely to hold anti-American attitudes. Given prior studies suggesting that terrorist recruitment is more likely among moderately religious Muslims (Atran 2003), that terrorists are rarely blinded by theology (Berman 2011) and are often manipulated by religious leaders (Sosis and Alcorta 2008), and that the influence of religiosity is mediated by psychological and economic resource loss (Canetti et al. 2010), it is likely that very devout Muslims are not the most antagonistic toward the USA.

Finally, we note that the data one utilizes significantly impact the results one gets. The data we use represent a snapshot of relations between the USA and five Muslim-majority countries at two points in time. Analysis that includes different countries, or that uses data collected at different moments in time, may return different results. Of particular importance is how one chooses to measure the dependent and independent variables. Because we are interested in a direct comparison, we examine people-to-people attitudes – our dependent variable is about individuals, not entire cultures. We expect that other researchers, asking other questions, may get different results (e.g. Chiozza 2010; Blaydes and Linzer 2012). In particular, we note the important differences in the models when religiosity is operationalized as a continuous, rather than binary, variable.

The mutual antagonism common between Americans in the USA and Muslims in the Islamic world is both concerning and complicated. The data presented here represent the first direct comparison of the sources of these attitudes in both populations, using individual-level survey data collected using the same questions at approximately the same time. This comparison is a first step toward better understanding – and potentially improving – these negative attitudes.

Notes

1. Our dependent variable, discussed in the methods section below, is favorability toward Americans, not toward the USA. Given that the USA is an important global actor and has a continued presence in the Muslim world, it is plausible that Muslims may hold American actions in international affairs against American citizens.
2. Chiozza (2010) finds an exception to this 'scapegoating' behavior in the Middle East, where those who are satisfied with how things are going in their own country are more likely to hold anti-American attitudes.
3. We chose to focus on Muslim-majority countries (rather than all Muslim respondents) in order to account for the effects of country-level political influences on attitudes.
4. In the Muslim-majority countries sampled, the very religious individuals who score 12 of 12 represent between 22% and 25% of respondents. In the American sample in 2008, the very religious score 7 on a 7-point scale of religiosity and represent about 35% of the sample. The inclusion of the church attendance question in 2011 makes the very religious American respondents those who score 11 or 12 on a 12-point scale of religiosity – about 25% of the respondent pool.
5. We also ran Poisson models of anti-American attitudes for both 2008 and 2011, using the continuous and the binary religious variables. The results of these models are very similar to those from the ordered probit models: for both years, satisfaction with the direction of the country and belief that growing trade is good are significant and negative predictors of anti-Americanism. Religiosity is only significant as a continuous variable and not as a binary variable. In 2011, support for keeping American troops in Afghanistan is also significant. The only major difference is that income is not significant in the Poisson models. The full results of the Poisson models are reported in the Appendix in Tables A6 and A7.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Appendix

Table A1. Anti-American and anti-Muslim ordered probit models (binary religiosity).

Independent variables	Anti-American 2008			Anti-Muslim 2008			Anti-American 2011			Anti-Muslim 2011		
	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference	Coef.	S.E.	First difference
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.002	0.052		−0.019	0.100		−0.373***	0.061	0.123	0.084	0.084	
Growing trade is good	−0.136***	0.025	0.148	−0.056	0.051		0.037	0.027		−0.177***	0.051	
Satisfaction with country	−0.151***	0.046	0.053	0.188	0.110		−0.200***	0.044	0.069	−0.285***	0.057	
Higher religiosity	0.049	0.049		0.157	0.099		0.047	0.046		0.092	0.100	
Gender	0.022	0.041		0.299***	0.093	.044	−0.033	0.039		0.175*	0.085	
Age	0.003	0.002		0.014***	0.003	.203	−0.002	0.002		0.008***	0.002	
Education	−0.014	0.022		−0.120***	0.039	.071	−0.044*	0.021	0.048	−0.022	0.036	
Income	−0.049**	0.018	0.054	−0.019	0.047		−0.043**	0.018	0.048	0.060	0.042	
Indonesia	−0.271***	0.060					−0.427***	0.056				
Lebanon	−0.466***	0.065					−0.371***	0.066				
Pakistan	0.515***	0.066					0.738***	0.063				
Turkey	0.974***	0.071					0.819***	0.065				
Cut 1	−1.796	0.102		−0.143	0.191		−1.673	0.100		−0.791	0.185	
Cut 2	−0.549	0.097		1.107	0.195		−0.516	0.097		0.518	0.184	
Cut 3	0.189	0.097		1.847	0.202		0.228	0.097		1.369	0.189	
N	3106			576			3400			679		
Number of countries	5			1			5			1		
LR chi^2(12)	580.74			51.38			700.40			68.47		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1. Jordan is the reference category for country dummies in the Anti-American model.
*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.

Table A2. Anti-American ordered probit models (country-specific/continuous religiosity/2008).

Independent variables	Indonesia		Jordan		Lebanon		Pakistan		Turkey	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.131	0.099	−0.097	0.108	0.017	0.109	0.412**	0.170	−0.567***	0.179
Growing trade is good	−0.171***	0.060	−0.072	0.043	−0.258***	0.059	0.023	0.071	−0.182**	0.066
Satisfaction with country	−0.327***	0.095	−0.128	0.080	−0.051	0.150	−0.378***	0.109	0.049	0.145
Religiosity	0.087**	0.033	0.012	0.023	0.021	0.013	0.032	0.023	0.035	0.019
Gender	0.085	0.087	−0.067	0.079	0.064	0.096	0.049	0.115	0.113	0.123
Age	0.006	0.004	−0.001	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005
Education	−0.006	0.049	0.007	0.049	−0.058	0.049	−0.025	0.050	0.040	0.069
Income	−0.009	0.035	−0.007	0.038	0.003	0.039	−0.194***	0.049	−0.139**	0.056
Cut 1	−0.901	0.407	−1.544	0.305	−1.534	0.254	−1.573	0.303	−1.947	0.329
Cut 2	0.746	0.403	−0.566	0.302	0.034	0.247	−0.546	0.293	−1.166	0.320
Cut 3	1.839	0.407	0.397	0.301	0.500	0.249	0.037	0.291	−0.726	0.318
N	647		784		552		595		528	
LR chi^2(8)	36.52		9.80		26.35		40.34		33.21	
Prob > chi^2	0.000		0.280		0.001		0.000		0.000	

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1.
*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.

Table A3. Anti-American ordered probit models (country-specific/binary religiosity/2008).

Independent variables	Indonesia		Jordan		Lebanon		Pakistan		Turkey	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.140	0.099	−0.109	0.105	0.003	0.109	0.409**	0.170	−0.570***	0.179
Growing trade is good	−0.172***	0.060	−0.071	0.043	−0.253***	0.060	0.038	0.071	−0.180**	0.066
Satisfaction with country	−0.323***	0.096	−0.127	0.079	−0.061	0.150	−0.366***	0.109	0.080	0.143
High Religiosity	0.138	0.088	0.071	0.090	−0.060	0.121	−0.039	0.145	0.164	0.187
Gender	0.078	0.087	−0.076	0.079	0.039	0.097	0.004	0.114	0.127	0.124
Age	0.006	0.004	−0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
Education	−0.002	0.048	0.007	0.049	−0.064	0.049	−0.017	0.049	0.031	0.069
Income	−0.006	0.035	−0.007	0.038	0.000	0.038	−0.196***	0.049	−0.144**	0.056
Cut 1	−1.787	0.227	−1.659	0.194	−1.707	0.231	−1.828	0.242	−2.187	0.301
Cut 2	−0.148	0.213	−0.681	0.188	−0.144	0.222	−0.801	0.229	−1.409	0.288
Cut 3	0.942	0.217	0.282	0.187	0.320	0.223	−0.219	0.227	−0.972	0.286
N	647		784		552		595		528	
LR chi^2(8)	31.88		10.14		23.82		38.45		30.63	
Prob > chi^2	0.000		0.255		0.003		0.000		0.000	

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1.
*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.

Table A4. Anti-American ordered probit models (country-specific/continuous religiosity/2011).

Independent variables	Indonesia		Jordan		Lebanon		Pakistan		Turkey	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	−0.113	0.116	−0.352**	0.125	−1.120***	0.149	0.003	0.170	0.204	0.181
Growing trade is good	−0.181***	0.061	0.218***	0.046	−0.108	0.085	0.136*	0.062	−0.182**	0.071
Satisfaction with country	−0.202**	0.089	−0.382***	0.077	0.359**	0.151	−0.406**	0.146	−0.141	0.103
Religiosity	0.006	0.029	0.021	0.022	0.029	0.015	0.047**	0.020	0.041**	0.018
Gender	−0.029	0.085	−0.104	0.078	−0.031	0.101	0.148	0.096	−0.102	0.103
Age	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.012**	0.043	−0.004	0.003	−0.006	0.003
Education	0.158***	0.050	0.008	0.041	−0.144**	0.055	−0.126**	0.045	−0.125*	0.059
Income	−0.028	0.040	−0.102***	0.035	−0.043	0.052	−0.025	0.039	0.049	0.050
Cut 1	−1.535	0.376	−1.052	0.266	−1.751	0.322	−1.541	0.271	−2.829	0.311
Cut 2	0.031	0.373	0.042	0.264	−0.674	0.318	−0.590	0.261	−1.741	0.290
Cut 3	1.154	0.375	0.871	0.265	−0.354	0.317	0.134	0.261	−0.933	0.286
N	675		834		496		800		595	
LR chi^2(8)	28.41		62.31		98.36		27.69		20.73	
Prob > chi^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.001		0.008	

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A5. Anti-American ordered probit models (country-specific/binary religiosity/2011).

Independent variables	Indonesia		Jordan		Lebanon		Pakistan		Turkey	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	−0.121	0.117	−0.364***	0.126	−1.222***	0.148	−0.043	0.169	0.041	0.181
Growing trade is good	−0.180***	0.061	0.223***	0.046	−0.086	0.084	0.157**	0.062	−0.172**	0.071
Satisfaction with country	−0.198*	0.089	−0.381***	0.077	0.357**	0.152	−0.404**	0.146	−0.082	0.102
High religiosity	−0.063	0.086	0.088	0.081	0.063	0.115	0.277	0.157	0.015	0.144
Gender	−0.037	0.085	−0.102	0.078	−0.017	0.101	0.125	0.095	−0.106	0.103
Age	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.012**	0.004	−0.003	0.003	−0.005	0.004
Education	0.159***	0.050	0.008	0.041	−0.149**	0.055	−0.114**	0.044	−0.121*	0.059
Income	−0.026	0.040	−0.101***	0.035	−0.046	0.052	−0.019	0.039	0.052	0.050
Cut 1	−1.604	0.227	−1.235	0.171	−1.945	0.305	−1.858	0.227	−3.018	0.301
Cut 2	−0.039	0.221	−0.141	0.166	−0.874	0.299	−0.910	0.213	−1.943	0.278
Cut 3	1.086	0.224	0.688	0.167	−0.555	0.298	−0.189	0.211	−1.142	0.272
N	675		834		496		800		595	
LR chi^2(8)	28.91		62.54		95.10		25.47		15.21	
Prob > chi^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.001		0.055	

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. Cut 1, Cut 2, and Cut 3 refer to 'cut-points' on a standardized normal distribution. Cut points are used to calculate the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable. The constant of the model would be interpreted as the inverse of Cut 1.
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A6. Anti-American multi-level models (continuous religiosity).

	Anti-American 2008		Anti-American 2011	
Independent variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.005	0.035	−0.173***	0.044
Growing trade is good	−0.056***	0.015	0.012	0.017
Satisfaction with country	−0.065*	0.030	−0.095***	0.029
Higher religiosity	0.013**	0.005	0.015**	0.005
Gender	0.012	0.026	−0.010	0.025
Age	0.001	0.001	−0.001	0.001
Education	−0.004	0.014	−0.017	0.013
Income	−0.020	0.011	−0.021	0.011
Constant	0.651	0.121	0.619	0.126
Country	0.211	0.068	0.228	0.074
Chibar^2(01)	199.33		263.52	
Prob>=chibar^2	0.000		0.000	
N	3106		3400	
Number of groups	5		5	
Wald chi^2(8)	30.48		43.41	
Prob > chi^2	0.000		0.000	

Note: Figures are standardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors.
*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.

Table A7. Anti-American multi-level models (binary religiosity).

	Anti-American 2011		Anti-Muslim 2011	
Independent variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Keep troops in Afghanistan	0.002	0.035	−0.178***	0.044
Growing trade is good	−0.055***	0.015	0.015	0.017
Satisfaction with country	−0.063*	0.030	−0.089***	0.029
Higher religiosity	0.017	0.033	0.020	0.031
Gender	0.007	0.027	−0.012	0.025
Age	0.001	0.001	−0.001	0.001
Education	−0.005	0.014	−0.016	0.013
Income	−0.020	0.012	−0.021	0.011
Constant	0.759	0.110	0.737	0.116
Country	0.208	0.067	0.221	0.071
Chibar^2(01)	190.40		242.04	
Prob>=chibar^2	0.000		0.000	
N	3106		3400	
Number of Groups	5		5	
Wald chi^2(8)	25.31		36.01	
Prob > chi^2	0.001		0.000	

Note: Figures are standardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors.
*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.